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THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION AS EPOCHE 
AND AS EXPLICATION 
Introduction 
A clear understanding of the notion of phenomenological reduction is 
crucial for any evaluation of the claims of Husserlian phenomenology. The 
phenomenological reduction is said to be the distinctive step (or steps) 
one has to take if one is to enter the realm of phenomenology proper. Hus-
serl labored all his life to find the best way which would lead the non-
phenomenologist into the new land which he thought he had discovered. 
Commentators have classified the ways discussed by Husserl under at least 
three main headings:1 the Cartesian way, the way through psychology, and 
the way through ontology. In each of these ways, one is urged to perform 
a phenomenological reduction. But since the ways are different, the step 
also of the phenomenological reduction varies somewhat for each approach. 
Husserl and his interpreters tried hard to clarify these subtle distinctions, 
but up to now their ways of speaking have proven rather opaque, especially 
to philosophers accustomed to the standards of clarity of Analytic Philosophy. 
In this paper I will therefore try to shed some light on the different 
notions of phenomenological reduction by relating them to familiar notions 
of contemporary semantics, such as the distinction between sense and referent 
and the notion of explication. It will be seen, however, that in each case an 
analogical transposition from ordinary semantics to what I propose to call 
metaphysical semantics is involved. The propriety of this analogical trans-
position is in my estimation the crux in deciding the meaningfulness of 
Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. 
The line of exposition will follow what I take to be some of the main 
turning points in the actual historical development of Husserl's thought.2 
But we are far from being able to give a full developmental account of 
Husserlian philosophy. Further study on the texts needs yet to be done; 
especially of the many important shifts in Husserl's philosophical terminol-
ogy, where a precise account is still missing. 
I. Descriptive Psychology Based on Inner Perception 
Brentano, Husserl's philosophical master, had taken up afresh the 
Lockean program of a careful reflective description of the immanently given 
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of consciousness. The reflective grasp of the immanently given he called 
"inner perception" {innere Wahrnehmung), and like Locke's "reflection" 
this inner perception was said to grasp intuitively the really occurring 
mental acts of different kinds: acts of simple presentation, of judgement, 
and of love and hate. Prominent among the objects of inner perception were 
the acts of external perception (aussere Wahrnehmung), such as perceiving 
a tree, hearing a noise, etc. 
But the status of the objects of external perception proved at once to be 
problematic. For instance, was the green tree which we perceive in our 
garden to be counted among the objects of descriptive psychology? Brentano 
still adhered to the representationalist view which stressed the distinction 
between the green tree which we see and the invisible colorless tree out 
there postulated by physics. He tried to describe the existence of the green 
tree as "in-existence" in the mind, but he had soon to admit that he could 
make no clear sense of this peculiar mental "in-existence". Husserl, on the 
other hand, started out as a scientific realist. He stressed that the green 
tree we perceive is identical with the tree investigated by physics, and he 
claimed therefore explicitly that the objects of external perception were 
not to be counted among the objects of descriptive psychology (or phenom-
enology, as he started to call it) .3 
A second major difficulty which concerned Husserl was the one raised 
by Natorp and Frege, namely their accusation of psychologism. It led 
Husserl to supplement Brentano's descriptive psychology with an explicit 
doctrine of abstraction, involving the admission of an intuition of universal 
kinds (Species) in order to account for the necessary character of, e.g., logical 
and ethical truths. Thus, at the time of the Logical Investigations (first 
edition), the Husserlian descriptive psychology or phenomenology was based 
both on the inner perception of real mental particulars and on the intuitive 
grasp of ideal universals. 
2. Phenomenology Presupposing a Universal Epoche 
In the period from 1904 to 1906, Husserl was led to reconsider, for 
various concurring reasons, his stand on the exclusion of the objects of ex-
ternal perception from the domain of phenomenology: 
2.1 In actual practice the mental acts could not be phenomenologically 
described without also describing their objects. Natorp, whose writings the 
early Husserl had been studying very closely, had even held that, for in-
stance, to describe the hearing of a tone was the same as to describe this 
tone.4 
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2.2 Already Husserl's attempts at giving the descriptive-psychological 
foundations of set theory and arithmetics had in fact included descriptions 
of intentional objects, namely of sets and numbers, and Husserl had thus 
been led to describe in detail the correlation between certain hierarchies 
of mental acts on the one hand, and their objects of lower and higher cate-
gorial order on the other hand. 
23 Husserl had already enlarged the domain of descriptive psychology 
by admitting not only real mental particulars but also ideal universals.6 
2.4 The Munich group (students of Theodor Lipps, such as Alexander 
Pfander and Johannes Daubert, who had greeted Husserl's Logical Inves-
tigations with enthusiasm) held that the new philosophy should not be limited 
to the description of the essences of mental particulars, but should be con-
cerned with the description of all essences whatsoever, i.e., including those 
of physical particulars. Meinong (another disciple of Brentano and founder 
of an influential group in Graz) also was proposing an all comprehensive 
"theory of objects" (Gegenstandstheorie). 
2.5 Furthermore, there was another most important consideration which 
may have prompted Husserl to reevaluate his position on the status of the 
objects of external perception, namely the discovery that the status of the 
objects of inner perception was equally problematic. In 18946 Husserl 
had found that he could explain an intuitive grasp of a nonimmanent real 
particular in terms of an analogy with the interpretation of a symbol or 
picture. He found, for instance, that as we can "see" a mountain which is 
not present by interpreting the paint marks on a canvas which are present, so 
in external perception we are perceiving a tree which is not immanent in 
consciousness by interpreting the sensations (Empfindungen) which are im-
manent. It would seem, therefore, that Husserl assumed at that time that 
any intuitive grasp of a real particular was either an inner perception of 
what is immanently present, or else a case where something immanently pres-
ent serves as a basis for an interpretation. To his astonishment, Husserl 
discovered after 1905, in his analyses of inner time-consciousness, that re-
membering could not be understood as an act of interpretation; that, for 
instance, remembering a past sound-sensation could not be described as an 
interpretation of a presently immanent sound-sensation, but had to be de-
scribed as a "direct" intuitive intending of a real particular which no longer 
existed.7 This exploded the myth of the unproblematic nature of inner per-
ception, because any perception whatsover necessarily involves some reten-
tion of the immediate past. In other words, a restriction of the domain of 
descriptive psychology or phenomenology to actually immanent real par-
ticulars proved to be absolutely impossible, since such a restriction would 
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veto not only the use of external perception but that of inner perception as 
well! 
The only way out of all these difficulties was to officially admit all 
intentional objects, i.e., the intentional correlates of all mental acts, into 
the domain of phenomenology. But at the same time the proper nature of 
phenomenology had to be safeguarded,- and a way had to be found to 
prevent its getting mixed up with physics and metaphysics. 
In looking for a solution, Husserl could go back in history to Descartes, 
for whom the cogito had included not only the act of cogitare and the ego 
but also the idea or the cogitatum qua cogitatum.8 Actually, Husserl even 
went back to the philosophical ancestors of Descartes, namely to the Skeptics: 
he read at this time a book by Raoul Richter, Der Skeptizismus in der 
Philosophic, which had just been published (vol. 1, Leipzig 1904), and 
it seems that it was from this book that he picked up the technical term 
"epoche" and incorporated it as a key term into his phenomenology.9 
The skeptical term "epoche" conveyed exactly (and more accurately than 
the Cartesian term "doubt") what could guarantee that the phenomenological 
description of a physical object would not be confused with the kind of 
account that is given by physics: in a phenomenological description of the 
appearance of an external object one has to abstain from making any claims 
concerning the actual reality of this object, i.e., all questions concerning 
actual reality have to be bracketed, set aside, left unanswered. For instance, 
I might accurately describe a present experience as one of seeing a round 
tower out there. If, later on, it should turn out that the tower in question 
was actually square, or that in actual reality there was no tower out there 
at all (that I had been having a hallucination), then my previous descrip-
tion would still remain a true phenomenological description. All I would 
have to do would be to make sure that in my previous description I had 
been careful not to claim that there actually was a tower out there which 
actually was round. 
Descartes and the Skeptics, as well as Husserl, found it both possible 
and philosophically necessary to give to this epoche an absolutely universal 
scope. They found it meaningful to guard the truthfulness of their descrip-
tions of consciousness not only against the ordinary possibility that some 
external perceptions might turn out to be illusions or hallucinations, but 
even against the metaphysical possibility that all external perceptions might 
be illusionary. Husserl explicitly envisioned the possibility that the belief in 
the actual existence of the material world might collapse entirely.10 
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In the winter semester, 1906/1907, Husserl described for the first time 
the phenomenological method as involving not merely the use of reflection 
and of intuition of universals, but as requiring also the initial performance 
of a phenomenological reduction, i.e., the adoption of a universal epoche}1 
Actually, the scope of the epoche is somewhat different according to 
whether one follows the Cartesian way or the way through psychology. 
Following the Cartesian way, which might be called the way through 
epistemology, one approaches transcendental consciousness by first bracketing 
everything that can be doubted, i.e., all transcendent referents, other minds 
included. Whereas, following the way through psychology, one starts out 
bracketing everything that does not belong into descriptive psychology, i.e., 
all the physical referents, but not the other minds. 
3- The Epoche and the Semantics of Sense and Referent 
The epoche introduces a certain distinction between the external object 
qua intentional object, i.e., qua appearance, and the external object qua 
actual reality. But Husserl's predecessors had been unable to provide a 
satisfactory clarification of this distinction. The two models used to explain 
the relationship between actual reality and appearance were (a) the rela-
tionship between cause and effect, and (b) the relationship between 
pictured or signified thing and picturing or signifying thing. But both the 
causal theory of the noumenon causing the phenomenon, and the representa-
tionalist theory according to which the appearance is said to be a picture 
or a sign of absolute reality, are unsatisfactory, and have run into strong 
criticism, especially in contemporary philosophy. Actually, Husserl himself 
is one of the fathers of this contemporary criticism, and it was for this very 
reason that he had from the start refused to distinguish two objects of 
external perception, a directly perceived immanent one and an inferred 
transcendent one. 
The only appropriate model for the distinction between appearance and 
actual reality is, as far as I can tell, the semantical relationship between 
sense and referent. Since it is well known that the contemporary analysis of 
this semantical distinction has its origin in Frege, it is interesting to note 
that at this very point in his development Husserl took a renewed interest 
in Frege's views on sense.12 In the summer semester, 1908, Husserl lectured 
on the theory of meaning (Bedeutungslehre)13 and on this occasion he was 
led to abandon his earlier view according to which meanings were a special 
sort of universal kinds (Species); instead he was led to admit that meanings, 
which he now called ontic meanings, were something sui generis, being 
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neither real particulars nor universal kinds. Actually, Husserl's views about 
meaning were now very similar to Frege's. But Husserl also took the further 
step of interpreting the troublesome notion of intentional object in terms 
of his newly found notion of ontic meaning or sense.14 
But unfortunately, while Husserl took a strong interest in the Fregean 
notion of sense, his phenomenological inclination prevented him from truly 
appreciating the importance of the notion of referent. Thus, while discussing 
the Fregean examples "the victor of Jena" and the "vanquished of Water-
loo",15 Husserl did not introduce the actually existing Napoleon as the 
identical referent of the two expressions; but instead he pointed out that 
the speaker intends to refer to the same X. That is, instead of introducing 
the Fregean notion of referent, Husserl elaborated the phenomenological 
notion of the-identical-X-meant, i.e., the notion of noematic pole. This 
noematic pole exists even in the cases where there is no referent, and thus 
it clearly belongs still on the level of the Fregan sense. 
Thus, while Husserl saw that the intentional object could be understood 
in terms of the notion of sense, it seems that he never fully realized that 
the notion of sense is necessarily connected with the notion of referent; 
and that if the intentional object is understood in terms of the notion of 
sense, then the epoche has to be denned as the provisional bracketing of all 
factual questions regarding the referent. 
Probably it was just because of his adoption of the epoche that Husserl 
never discussed the notion of referent. But this was a mistake; Husserl 
should have realized that the epoche required only that all factual questions 
regarding the actual existence of the referent of external perception had to 
be bracketed, but that it did not rule out an investigation of the notion of 
referent. Another reason why Husserl did not elaborate the notion of 
referent may have been his above mentioned early rejection of representa-
tionalism and of the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself. He should have 
realized, however, that a rejection of the notion of a thing-in-itself "hidden 
behind" the phenomena does not ipso facto entail the rejection of the notion 
of a referent, since the referent is not said to be "hidden behind" the sense, 
but is rather described as being revealed through the sense.16 
4. The Ordinary Notion of Referent and the Metaphysical 
Notion of Referent 
One has to admit, however, that what is here in question is not the 
ordinary notion of referent, but a metaphysical notion of referent. The basic 
referents in ordinary semantics constitute what is called the universe of dis-
course. But while Bertrand Russell had tried to identify the universe of 
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discourse of his system with absolute metaphysical reality, this is no longer 
true of the contemporary logicians. They hold rather that one and the same 
reality can be described in terms of different universes of discourse. This 
shows that the universe of discourse of a contemporary constructional system 
has to be understood as being already a conceptualization of reality. There-
fore the ordinary referents which compose a universe of discourse are, 
metaphysically speaking, already appearances and not metaphysical reality 
as it is in itself.17 
The theory of sense and referent, as it is worked out in contemporary 
possible-world-semantics, allows for the singling out of the actual world 
within the set of all possible worlds. But these possible worlds are not 
what may be called different possible conceptualizations: they are merely 
all the possible factual variations within the framework of one single con-
ceptualization. These possibilities can cover the above mentioned possibilities 
of ordinary illusion and hallucination, since they allow, for instance, for a 
distinction between the following three kinds of possible worlds: (a) 
worlds where the tower mentioned above is square, (b) worlds where the 
above mentioned tower is round, (c) worlds where the above mentioned 
tower does not exist at all. But ordinary possible-world-semantics does not 
deal with the question of metaphysical illusion, namely, with the possibility 
that an entire world picture, an entire conceptual scheme (an entire ontology) 
may be mistaken. (Notice here, that the possibility that several different 
conceptual schemes may be equally correct is left open. The notion of a 
metaphysical illusion merely presupposes the falsity of the claim that all 
conceptual schemes are equally correct.) 
As a matter of fact, the metaphysical notion of referent involves a 
problematic transposition of the ordinary relationship between sense and 
referent to the metaphysical level: " 
ordinary semantics 
—mental acts 
—ordinary sense (incl. 
appearance in the 
ordinary sense) = 
ordinary noema: 
I—ordinary ontic meanings 




metaphysical sense (incl.— 
appearance in the 
metaphysical sense) = 
metaphysical noema: 
ordinary ontic meanings— 
ordinary noematic poles— 
poles of the metaphysi—' 
cal noema 
metaphysical referent— 
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What from the ordinary point of view is called a referent is metaphysically 
speaking still a kind of noematic pole. A metaphysical illusion, if there is 
such a thing, would be analogous to an ordinary illusion: just as in the case 
of an ordinary illusion there is an ordinary noematic pole, but no ordinary 
referent which has the intended properties, thus in the case of a metaphysical 
illusion there would be the poles of the metaphysical noema (namely, the 
referents in the ordinary sense), but there would be no counterpart with 
the intended determinations in actual metaphysical reality. In a way similar 
to that in which the argument from ordinary illusion warrants the distinc-
tion between the ordinary sense and the ordinary referent, an argument 
from metaphysical illusion would justify a distinction between a metaphysical 
sense and a metaphysical referent. 
Of course, the correspondence between metaphysical semantics and 
ordinary semantics could never be a sameness-relation, but can only be 
an analogy. The metaphysical notion of truth, for instance, must be quite 
different from the concept of truth in ordinary semantics. This is evident 
from the fact that an articulation is by definition already a form of con-
ceptualization (of sense) and therefore the metaphysical counterpart of 
the articulated plurality of the ordinary referents cannot be said to be an 
articulated plurality; the metaphysical analogue of the articulated plurality of 
the ordinary referents must rather be some sort of preconceptual determinate-
ness of the metaphysical referent. (Notice that I prefer to use the notion 
of metaphysical referent in the singular.) 
.5. Phenomenological Analysis as Analysis of Sense 
With the admission of the intentional-object-as-such (the noema) into 
the domain of phenomenology, phenomenology became both noetic and 
noematic phenomenology. Noematic Phenomenology even takes precedence 
over noetic phenomenology: the analysis of the noema requires only a re-
flection on the sense of what is before us,19 whereas the analysis of the noesis 
presupposes that consciousness has the ability of what might be decribed as 
"turning all the way back upon itself". It is thus not astonishing to find 
Husserl now states that noematic phenomenology comes first and has to 
serve as a "guiding thread" for the more difficult analysis of the noesis.20 
But noematic phenomenology is concerned with the analysis of intentional-
objects-as-such, i.e., with the analysis of sense. Therefore phenomenology 
as such is now primarily analysis of sense. This means that it is now much 
more closely related to Analytic Philosophy, whose chief method is the 
analysis of the meaning of linguistic expressions.21 
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Actually results mentioned above (in section 2.3), according to which 
even the objects of so-called inner perception already involve a process of 
constitution, suggest that not only noematic phenomenology but noetic 
phenomenology as well is concerned with the analysis of certain intentional-
objects-as-such, and is thus nothing but analysis of sense. 
One is tempted to say that all phenomenology is somehow noematic 
phenomenology, that noetic phenomenology is merely the special case where 
the noema involved is the noema of inner perception. But Husserl did not 
use this way of speaking, and it would really be misleading to adopt it. 
For clearly, the sense in which noetic phenomenology could be described 
as an analysis of the noema of inner perception is not the same as the sense 
in which noematic phenomenology can be described as a description of 
noemata, e.g., of the noemata of external perception; it is rather the sense 
in which noematic phenomenology could be described as including a de-
scription of the noema of the noema of external perception.22 Furthermore, 
to regard noetic phenomenology as a form of noematic phenomenology 
would mean to apply the epoche not only with respect to the external objects 
but also with respect to consciousness itself. But Husserl only advocated 
a demundanization of our notion of consciousness and he did not mean to 
exclude factual statements concerning the demundanized transcendental 
stream of consciousness which is immediately present to the phenomenolo-
gist.23 (Of course these factual questions are excluded from the eidetic part 
of phenomenology, but that is another matter.) If one would argue that 
the epoche had to be applied with respect to the noetic acts simply because 
our reflective knowledge of these acts too is always mediated by a noema, 
then a similar argument could be made which would require an epoche 
also with respect to all the noemata themselves; thus nothing would remain 
outside the scope of the epoche, which would be absurd. 
However, the claim that phenomenology as such is nothing but analysis 
of sense is nevertheless true, because all phenomenology can indeed be char-
acterized as being concerned with the analysis of the constitution of sense, 
i.e., with the correlation between noesis and noema. 
6. Phenomenological Analysis as a Form of Explication 
One form of meaning analysis described by analytic philosophers and 
practized by both analytic philosophers and scientists in general is what is 
called explication, namely, the move from expressions of ordinary language 
to explicitly defined expressions of a technical language, i.e., to expressions 
of a language with an explicit system of exact definitions.24 It is illuminating, 
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I think, to view the step from ordinary descriptions to the descriptions of 
transcendental phenomenology as such a step of explication, that is, as a 
step of translation from ordinary ways of speaking into the highly technical 
language of transcendental phenomenology. For instance, instead of saying 
"I am seeing a green tree" a transcendental phenomenologist might report 
"My intentional acts of visual perception are directed towards a constituted 
perceptual noema Green Tree". 
This characterization of phenomenological analysis as a kind of expli-
cation is in agreement with Husserl's emphatic claim that phenomenology 
is a strict science. But the most interesting feature of this way of specifying 
what phenomenology is doing, is that no mention of performing an epoche 
has to be made. From this point of view transcendental phenomenology is 
concerned not with setting certain kinds of nonphenomenological knowledge 
aside, but with translating all our knowledge claims into a most accurate 
scientific language. 
This corresponds exactly to what we find Husserl saying when he stressed 
the distinctive advantage of the way into phenomenology through ontology.25 
As a matter of fact, Husserl had become increasingly dissatisfied with the 
Cartesian way (and also with the way through psychology). The main 
reason for his dissatisfaction had been precisely the fact that the epoche in-
volved seemed to obscure the really universal scope of phenomenological 
analysis. Husserl discovered, on the other hand, that if one followed the 
way through ontology, nothing had to be bracketed or excluded from phe-
nomenology. If one follows the way through ontology (which might also 
be called the Kantian way) one is led into transcendental phenomenology 
by the aim of explaining the categories and necessary truths of our concep-
tual schemes. According to Husserl, this aim can be achieved by making 
explicit the constituting activity that is involved in building up our knowl-
edge. From this point of view, phenomenology leaves nothing out, but 
rather broadens (adds a new dimension to) our knowledge. From the 
point of view of this third way, the transcendental phenomenological reduc-
tion, i.e., the step which brings us into transcendental phenomenology, is 
not an act of epoche. Rather is it an act of conversion, of changing from the 
natural view of the world (which, according to Husserl, can easily degener-
ate into a mistaken naturalistic view) to the more perfect and more compre-
hensive transcendental view of the world. 
Of course, it remains true that physics is not phenomenology, and thus 
it still makes sense to recommend an epoche, an explicit bracketing of the 
results of physics, but only as far as this can be a safeguard preventing a 
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naturalistic confusion between phenomenology, i.e., conceptual analysis, and 
a scientific investigation of mundane matters of fact. The epoche is no longer 
the first step in the phenomenological method, it is now merely a useful 
accessory device to preserve methodological purity (to prevent a "metabasis", 
i.e., to prevent slipping into the category mistakes of naturalism). 
7. Logical Explication and Phenomenological Explication 
However, just as we have seen before that the phenomenological epoche 
is not an ordinary epoche bracketing factual questions concerning an ordinary 
referent, but a more problematic metaphysical epoche bracketing factual 
questions concerning the metaphysical referent, so we find here that trans-
cendental phenomenology is not concerned with an explication of the kind 
we are familiar with from science or from the constructional systems of the 
logicians, but with a more problematic kind of explication. 
In an ordinary explication, the meaning of the explicata is said to be 
more explicit because each term has been assigned its exact place in an ex-
plicitly stated system of definitions. Transcendental phenomenology, how-
ever, possesses as yet no explicitly stated system of definitions, such a logical 
systematization of it is still a totally unrealized desideratum. But one might 
say that in phenomenological "explication" the meaning of the "explicata" 
is more explicit in another sense, namely, in the sense that each intentional 
object, each ontic meaning, is being assigned its exact place in the accurately 
described "system" of transcendental constitution. 
Carnap had once attempted to do logical explication and this kind of 
phenomenological "explication" simultaneously: when in his book The Logi-
cal Structure of the World (1928) he tried to sketch an all comprehensive 
constructional system of definitions, he wanted to give by the same stroke 
an account of a possible route of transcendental constitution.26 But it seems, 
in principle, impossible that the train of definitions of some constructional 
system could be an adequate representation of the progression of transcenden-
tal constitution. The point is that while transcendental constitution is said 
to start from the unarticulated stream of experience, every constructional 
system must start from an already articulated universe of discourse. Carnap's 
Aufbau, for instance, has a universe of discourse of so-called elementary 
experiences (i.e., momentary cross sections of the stream of experience).27 
I do not want to claim that the study of constructional definitions is of 
no help towards an understanding of the processes of constitution. Quite 
on the contrary, it would seem that constructional methods, like, e.g., defi-
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nition by abstraction based on an equivalence relation, are methods operative 
in constitution, namely, at higher levels of constitution. And the processes 
at the lower, prepredicative levels of constitution seem to have some as yet 
not exactly specified analogy to the processes occurring at the higher levels. 
8. Phenomenology and Cartesian Epistemology 
Husserl had become increasingly dissatisfied with the Cartesian way 
into phenomenology. Does this mean that he came to reject Cartesian episte-
mology as being misguided or even outright nonsensical? Some interpreters 
of Husserl seem to argue this, but it remains a fact that Husserl did not 
categorically dismiss the Cartesian way.28 It seems, therefore, that his criticism 
of the Cartesian way was not that it was wrong, but merely that in actual 
practice it was not very effective in achieving what it is designed to achieve 
(namely, to introduce the uninitiated to phenomenology), since it can 
give the wrong impression that the scope of phenomenology is a very limited 
one. 
The point which has to be stressed, I think, is that phenomenology as 
such is not the same as epistemology.29 Epistemology is the discipline which 
seeks to assess the value of our knowledge claims, while phenomenology 
is primarily a descriptive and not an evaluative discipline. The relation of 
transcendental phenomenology (which describes transcendental conscious-
ness and its activities of constitution) to epistemology, is similar to the 
relation of ordinary psychology to an ordinary assessment of the reliability 
of our mental capacities. One can therefore argue that the Cartesian way is 
unsatisfactory as an introduction to phenomenology precisely because it 
burdens the beginner prematurely with difficult epistemological distinctions 
(such as the distinction between appearance and reality), and limits him 
unnecessarily, i.e., for purely epistemological reasons, to a solipsistic starting 
point. The limitation to a solipsistic starting point is unnecessary for phe-
nomenology, but it is essential for an epistemology in the spirit of Descartes, 
and as far as I know, Husserl has never doubted that for epistemology the 
Cartesian approach is the only appropriate one. 
One can, however, raise the further question, whether in the light of 
certain results of his phenomenological investigations, Husserl should have 
rejected the Cartesian approach to epistemology, though as a matter of fact 
he never did reject it. This question is a very difficult one; it is none other 
than the question as to whether the contemporary objections against the 
so-called myth of the given have succeeded to demolish beyond repair the 
Cartesian program for epistemology; whether they actually render the 
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Cartesian program irrevocably obsolete. I do not pretend to be able to give 
a decisive answer to this difficult question, but I believe that more attention 
to the semantical distinction between sense and referent can contribute 
towards a much needed clarification of the issue. 
The phenomenological results which I have in mind and which concur 
with analogous findings in contemporary analytic philosophy are the ones 
mentioned above (in section 2.5), according to which not only in external 
perception but also in so-called inner perception we are faced with an already 
constituted noematic object. Does this not show that the myth of the given, 
i.e., the notion of an unmediated, "naked" immanent given which could 
serve as the apodictically given starting point of all knowledge, is untenable? 
To clarify the issue I would like to draw attention to the following four 
points: 
8.1 Sense can still be made of the claim that inner perception, in contrast 
to external perception, refers to a directly present object. 
The fact that inner perception too involves an already constituted inten-
tional object, does not entail that the referent of inner perception is not 
directly present. If the intentional object in question is understood to be 
a noematic object which belongs on the level of sense, and if one under-
stands that the referent is not hidden behind the sense like one thing may 
be hidden behind another thing, then it is still possible to make sense of the 
claim that inner perception is "perceiving" a "directly present" referent. 
On the other hand, external perception is "less direct", not in the sense that 
its referent would be "invisible", but simply in the sense that its referent 
is separated from the perceiver by a spatial distance. 
Of course, in the light of the analyses of inner time-consciousness, the 
situation turns out to be more complex than it was thought to be at first. 
If inner perception is reflection involving memory, then "directly present" 
cannot mean "really immanent now", but must mean "immanently present 
in the specious present" where the specious present includes an immediate 
past which is still intuitively "present" (i.e., retained by way of so-called 
"horizontal retentions"), but not really (reell) present, since strictly speak-
ing it is already past. 
8.2 The claim that the intentional object of external perception is consti-
tuted on the basis of immanent sensations is still meaningful. 
Since in perception we do not have the kind of freedom with respect 
to the object which we have in imagination, therefore in perception a special 
limiting factor must be present. In the case of inner perception this limiting 
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factor can be identified with the directly present immanent referent. But in 
external perception, too, there must be a limiting factor which is immanent; 
because an external object which is transcendent can only be known by a 
human knower if it causes an effect in the knower. Husserl calls the immanent 
limiting factor of external perception "sensations" (Empfindungen). 
8.3 The claim that we are not only able to reflect on the sense (the noematic 
objects) of our acts, but that we are furthermore capable of reflecting on 
the noetic acts and sensations themselves (that we can have an inner per-
ception of our acts and sensations) is not prima facie meaningless. 
8.4 One may furthermore claim that we have a nonreflective consciousness 
of our acts and sensations. Especially if it is assumed that the knower is 
essentially consciousness, i.e., that the knower must be conscious in one sense 
or another of everything which is immanent, then nonreflective conscious-
ness of acts and sensations must precede any reflective consciousness (i.e., 
any inner perception) of them. And it would seem that we can find such a 
nonreflective awareness in our actual experience. Roman Ingarden, e.g., has 
described it as a conscious "living-through" (Durcbleben), and J.-P. 
Sartre too has given an account of unreflected consciousness (la conscience 
irrifiechie).30 Husserl's descriptions of the sensations (Empfindungen) as 
experiences (Erlebnisse) which are a kind of nonintentional feelings (nicht-
intentionale Gejiihle) belong also in this context.31 Such a nonreflective 
living-through, however, though it is a form of consciousness, is unlike a 
perception, precisely because it involves no duality of perceiving act and 
perceived object. Such a pure "living present" includes no objedification, 
i.e., no articulation, and therefore it is not knowledge in the proper sense 
of the word. 
However, even to concede these four claims is not yet sufficient to 
remove the doubts concerning the Cartesian program for epistemology. 
Does not the fact that the ultimate "given", namely the living present, is 
either merely lived-through and thus not known in the proper sense of the 
word, or else is known, but only in reflection when it is no longer really 
present, cause the Cartesian program to collapse? For in neither one of the 
two alternatives is the "given" given in the form of absolutely certain 
knowledge, and therefore there is no absolutely certain knowledge to start 
from. 
This is, in my opinion, the heart of the question. 
On the one hand, the Cartesian program does not seem to be totally 
misguided, because even if there is no absolutely certain knowledge there 
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is nevertheless a genuine sense in which knowledge of what is immanent 
does have an epistemological priority, i.e., is in a certain respect more certain 
than knowledge of what is transcendent. Knowledge of what is transcendent 
does in fact genetically presuppose (is in fact built on) an awareness of 
what is immanent, i.e., is in fact based on a prereflectively lived-through 
living present of the really real stream of consciousness. On the other hand, 
however, it is also true that in another respect knowledge of what is trans-
cendent is more certain than knowledge of what is immanent, since living-
through is not knowing and reflective inner perception, even if there is 
such a thing, is less reliable because it requires us to take up an attitude 
which is much less natural for us than the attitude of external perception. 
I am therefore inclined to think that a modified form of the Cartesian 
program has to be worked out, where the simplistic notion of the absolute 
certainty of inner experience is abandoned, but where the epistemological 
importance of inner experience with its specific and irreplaceable kind of 
certainty is nevertheless recognized. It may therefore still be correct to 
require that the process of epistemological justification start from the solip-
sistic starting point of the living present of consciousness. But then the 
specific weakness of inner experience must also be taken into account, i.e., 
one must check the account based on inner experience and see to it that 
it harmonizes with the convictions based on external perception. That is 
to say, one must strengthen the epistemological justification by making 
appropriate use of the specific kinds of certainty which are available in 
each type of experience. 
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